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Reduced Cross-Border Lending and Financing Costs of SMEs
Abstract
This paper investigates how the withdrawal of banks from their cross-border business
impacted the borrowing costs of European ﬁrms since the crisis. We combine aggregate
information on total and cross-border credit with ﬁrm-level survey data for the period
2010 - 2014. We ﬁnd that the decline in cross-border lending led to a deterioration in
the borrowing conditions of small ﬁrms. In countries with more pronounced reductions
in cross-border credit inﬂows, the likelihood of a rise in ﬁrms' external ﬁnancing costs
increased. This result is mainly driven by the interbank channel, which plays a crucial
role in transmitting shocks to the real sector across borders.
Keywords: International banking, ﬁrm ﬁnance, credit constraints
JEL-Classiﬁcations: F34, F36, G15, G21
1. Introduction
This study aims at contributing to a better understanding of the impact of changes
in international credit market integration on the real economy. Previous literature shows
that ﬁnancial integration alleviates the ﬁnancing constraints of ﬁrms (e.g. Harris et al.
1994, Gallego and Loayza 2001), with some studies ﬁnding that small ﬁrms can especially
beneﬁt from credit market liberalization (Gelos and Werner 2002, Laeven 2002). Given
that the global ﬁnancial crisis led to a considerable retrenchment in international capital
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 23, 2017
  
ﬂows, our goal is to investigate how the reduction in cross-border bank lending aﬀected
the access to ﬁnance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the implications of credit market fragmen-
tation for SMEs within the euro area, while other studies focus on developing or emerging
economies. In contrast to previous studies, the question we ask here is whether the drop
in foreign lending since the crisis has increased borrowing costs for ﬁrms. Indeed, our
regression results indicate that ﬁrms in countries that experienced sharper reductions in
cross-border credit inﬂows were more likely to see their credit costs rise. When comparing
the importance of credit inﬂows to banks and to non-banks for this eﬀect, we ﬁnd that it
is mainly the fragmentation of the interbank credit market that drives the negative link
between cross-border credit and credit costs of SMEs in the euro area.
Several studies show that credit markets have become more fragmented since the crisis
(Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011, Bruno and Shin 2014, Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011, Lane
2013, 2014a,b, Bremus and Fratzscher 2015), and that the decline in cross-border bank
lending is particularly pronounced and persistent in the euro area. According to Wehinger
(2013), SMEs are particularly aﬀected by ﬁnancial fragmentation.1 Overall, in the euro
area, new bank credit to small ﬁrms declined by nearly 40 percent between 2008 and
the beginning of 2014 (Figure 1), with SMEs reporting deteriorating credit availability in
many euro area countries (Figure 2). Regarding SMEs' costs of funding, although average
loan rates for ﬁrms have decreased since 2012, the spreads between loan rates for small
and large loans have increased signiﬁcantly (Figures 3), especially in those countries hit
hardest by the crisis.
Owing to the fact that ﬁrms in the euro area are highly dependent on bank ﬁnancing,
tight credit market conditions can importantly limit their access to external ﬁnance. As
1Reasons for the borrowing limits faced by small ﬁrms include their opaqueness and, hence, the larger
information asymmetries between banks and small ﬁrms compared to larger and listed ﬁrms for which
hard information is readily available.
2
  
SMEs make up for more than 98 percent of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the EU, about 60 percent
of gross value added, and nearly 70 percent of employment, their credit conditions play
an important role for investment, innovation, and growth in the euro area.
Combining ﬁrm-level with macroeconomic data, we run probit regressions to test diﬀer-
ent channels through which credit market fragmentation aﬀects the ﬁnancing constraints
of SMEs. External ﬁnancing costs are measured using micro-level data from the Survey
on Access to Finance of Enterprises in the Euro Area (SAFE). The SAFE data contain
information on borrowing conditions and business characteristics of European SMEs. Ag-
gregate credit data come from the International Banking Statistics and from the Statistics
on Credit to the Private Sector provided by the Bank for International Settlements.
The data reveal that access to ﬁnance was, indeed, among the most pressing problems
for SMEs in the euro area in the aftermath of the crisis (Figure 4). However, there are
pronounced diﬀerences across countries. Not surprisingly, access to ﬁnance is particularly
problematic in the periphery countries. In contrast, only about six percent of German
ﬁrms listed access to ﬁnance as their most pressing problem at the end of 2013. These
diﬀerences across countries potentially point to a strong fragmentation of credit markets
in the euro area, with capital not necessarily ﬂowing to where it can be employed most
fruitfully. Our regression analysis examines this issue in more detail by looking at the
impact of changes in cross-border credit ﬂows on ﬁrms' ﬁnancing costs.
Credit market segmentation can aﬀect ﬁrms' access to ﬁnance through diﬀerent chan-
nels. First, a decline in credit inﬂows from abroad can increase ﬁnancing costs because
of reduced direct cross-border lending to ﬁrms (at arms-length or through foreign aﬃli-
ates). As shown by ﬁrm-level survey-data from the EFIGE project for seven European
countries,2 on average, about eight percent of SMEs used foreign bank credit in 2008/09.
2Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom. For more details, see Altomonte
and Aquilante (2012).
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However, there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity across countries. Whereas nearly
15 percent of French SMEs used services by foreign banks, less than ﬁve percent of German
SMEs did so.
Second - even if individual ﬁrms do not have a direct relationship with foreign banks
- a decrease in foreign credit inﬂows has indirect eﬀects on the ﬁrm's ﬁnancing condi-
tions through its impact on the domestic credit market. On the one hand, contestability
and, hence, competitive pressures in the domestic banking sector decrease due to frag-
mentation, with potentially adverse eﬀects on the retail credit market. Consequently,
banks may charge higher lending rates to their clients (Bremus 2015, de Blas and Russ
2013). On the other hand, credit market fragmentation can reduce domestic lending if
the (wholesale) funding conditions of domestic banks deteriorate (Feyen et al. 2014, Brei
2007) as cross-border interbank credit becomes scarce. For the case of Turkey, Baskaya
et al. (2017) ﬁnd a positive link between the credit supply of domestic banks that have a
higher share of wholesale liabilities and capital inﬂows. Based on micro-data for a set of
euro area banks, De Haan et al. (2017) ﬁnd that loan rates increase and lending volumes
fall in response to a wholesale funding shock, especially in those countries most hit by the
European sovereign debt crisis. Hence, wholesale and interbank funding seems to be an
important transmission channel of global credit cycles.
Our estimation results indicate, ﬁrst, that SMEs in countries experiencing stronger
reductions in cross-border bank lending are more likely to face increasing loan rates.
This relationship is meaningful both statistically and economically. Second, the negative
link between cross-border credit growth and ﬁnancing costs of SMEs seems to be driven
primarily by the interbank lending channel. The stronger the reduction in cross-border
credit to the banking system, the more likely ﬁrms are to see their loan rates rise. Yet,
the impact of direct cross-border lending from banks to ﬁrms is statistically insigniﬁcant
in our setup.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss
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how our study is related to previous literature. Section 3 gives a detailed overview of the
data employed and the empirical methodology used. Section 4 presents the regression
results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Our analysis is related to two main strands of literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on external ﬁnancing constraints of small ﬁrms. Several studies use survey
information on the perceived and actual ﬁnancing obstacles reported by ﬁrms, e.g. from
the World Business Environment Survey (Beck et al. 2006, Beck et al. 2008, Coluzzi et al.
2012), from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), or,
more recently, from the SAFE.
Using SAFE data for the 2009-2011 period, Ferrando and Mulier (2015) present ev-
idence that less productive, more leveraged, and younger SMEs are more likely to face
external ﬁnancing constraints. The authors argue that the global ﬁnancial crisis is a good
starting point to study external ﬁnancing constraints, as SMEs in the euro area were
likely to experience increased ﬁnancing obstacles during the post-crisis period. In addi-
tion, the subsequent debt crisis in the euro area and the structural changes, especially
in the crisis-hit periphery countries, impaired the availability of external ﬁnancing, espe-
cially for the more opaque SMEs. Artola and Genre (2011) use panel data from SAFE
for the 2009-2010 period in order to study which ﬁrm characteristics aﬀected the access
to ﬁnance of SMEs during the crisis. Their estimation results reveal that, in particular,
young and small ﬁrms have experienced credit constraints. In a cross-sectional analysis of
2009, Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) ﬁnd that age and ownership are important drivers
of perceived ﬁnancing constraints: older ﬁrms and ﬁrms owned by shareholders or other
ﬁrms are less ﬁnancing constrained. Holton et al. (2014) explore the impact of the crisis on
credit supply and demand using SAFE data for 2009 to 2011 for the EU. They show that
banks tightened lending standards, but that credit demand by SMEs was also reduced.
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Using bank-level data for the Netherlands from the Bank Lending Survey, van der Veer
and Hoeberichts (2016) demonstrate that changes in the level of lending standards lead
to changes in business lending.
In a study relying on the BEEPS data for Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Beck
et al. (2014) present evidence that banks' lending techniques matter for credit constraints
of SMEs. They show that relationship lending reduces ﬁnancing constraints in cyclical
downturns, but not in booms. Using conﬁdential micro-data on Portuguese banks and
ﬁrms, Iyer et al. (2014) look at the eﬀect that the drying up of the interbank market had
on loan availability for ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms especially had problems in
accessing ﬁnance due to reductions in interbank lending. Furthermore, small ﬁrms were
not able to substitute banks loans with other sources of ﬁnance.
Apart from survey data, a large set of studies exploits ﬁrm balance sheet information in
order to measure ﬁnancing constraints by the sensitivity of investment to cash-ﬂow. The
idea is that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms are more cash-ﬂow sensitive than unconstrained
ﬁrms. That is, constrained ﬁrms must rely more on internal funding (Fazzari and Petersen
1993). Yet, cash-ﬂow sensitivity as a measure of ﬁnancing constraints is criticized (Kaplan
and Zingales 1997, Kaplan and Zingales 2000). Following Almeida et al. (2004), several
papers alternatively measure ﬁrms' ﬁnancing obstacles by the cash ﬂow sensitivity of
cash − a measure more focused on the ﬁnancial situation of the ﬁrm than the cash-ﬂow
sensitivity of investment. Based on the cash-ﬂow sensitivity of cash, Baum et al. (2011)
ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial architecture is important for reducing the ﬁnancing constraints of
small ﬁrms: bank-based systems tend to provide better access to ﬁnance for SMEs than
market-based systems in normal times. However, the authors point out that the results
may diﬀer in crisis times. We contribute to this literature by addressing the question of
how changes in the degree of credit market integration aﬀect the credit costs of SMEs in
the euro area.
A second - but smaller - strand of the literature is devoted to the link between cross-
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border banking and the external ﬁnancing constraints of small ﬁrms. While, among others,
Berger et al. (2001) and Mian (2006) show that foreign banks avoid lending to small and
opaque ﬁrms in developing countries, Clarke et al. (2001) and Clarke et al. (2005) ﬁnd
that foreign banks lend to small ﬁrms in developing and emerging economies at least as
much as domestic banks do. Other studies point in the same direction: After ﬁnancial
liberalization, the cash-ﬂow sensitivity of investment was reduced in Chile (Gallego and
Loayza 2001), Indonesia (Harris et al. 1994), and for small ﬁrms in Mexico (Gelos and
Werner 2002). Laeven (2002) studies the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on ﬁrms' access
to ﬁnance using a panel of 13 developing countries over the 1988-1998 period. After liber-
alization, small listed ﬁrms' investment becomes less sensitive to changes in cash-ﬂow, i.e.
ﬁrms become less ﬁnancially constrained. However, large ﬁrms become more constrained
after liberalization - possibly due to preferential treatment before liberalization. In a sim-
ilar vein, Forbes (2007) presents evidence that smaller listed companies are more hurt by
the introduction of capital controls than larger ones.
Beck et al. (2011) explore bank-level survey evidence from 2006 to analyze to what
extent and under which conditions foreign and domestic banks lend to SMEs. Their
sample includes 11 large banks operating in advanced economies and 80 large banks
operating in developing countries. Against the conventional view that small, domestic
banks are more likely to give credit to SMEs, the authors present evidence that foreign
banks lend as much to SMEs as domestic banks do. Yet, foreign banks use diﬀerent
lending techniques and organizational structures.
Giannetti and Ongena (2009) study the eﬀects of foreign bank entry on young, small
Eastern European ﬁrms, both listed and unlisted. Using a linked micro-macro dataset,
they ﬁnd that foreign bank presence fosters ﬁrms' use of loans and reduces their cost
of debt. However, large ﬁrms beneﬁt more from a foreign bank entry than small ﬁrms.
Based on survey data for a set of Eastern European countries in 2005 and 2008, Popov and
Udell (2012) present evidence that, during the crisis, SMEs' ﬁnancing constraints were
7
  
aﬀected by the deterioration of their banks' ﬁnancial health. In addition, they show that
the balance sheet weaknesses of foreign parent banks translated into ﬁnancing obstacles
for SMEs.
3. Data and Empirical Methodology
In order to analyze the eﬀects of the reduction in international bank lending on the
ﬁnancing conditions of SMEs since the crisis, we use a linked micro-macro dataset for 11
euro area countries over the 2010−2014 period. Detailed information on the data used is
in the Data Appendix.
The linking of micro- to macro-level data in our paper is similar to the setup other
studies have chosen. For example, Giannetti and Ongena (2009) explain ﬁrm-level growth
and ﬁrm-level ﬁnancing conditions by country-level foreign lending, where foreign lending
is computed as lending by foreign banks relative to total lending in a given country and
year. Baum et al. (2011) investigate how the structure of the ﬁnancial system (as measured
by the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks) aﬀects ﬁnancial constraints at
the ﬁrm-level (measured by ﬁrms' cash-ﬂow sensitivity of cash). Langﬁeld and Pagano
(2016) address the question of how the structure of the entire ﬁnancial system (bank-
based versus market-based) impacts on the risk-taking of individual ﬁnancial institutions.
Hence, in these studies, while the dependent variables are measured at the ﬁrm-level, the
explanatory variables of interest are the same across ﬁrms in each country, as is the case
in our analysis here.
The availability of cross-border credit data at the ﬁrm-level would be very helpful in
order to get a more granular picture. But, to the best of our knowledge, these data are
currently not available for the euro area countries in a harmonized form. We consider
our analysis as a ﬁrst step in investigating the question of how the reduction of European
credit market integration has aﬀected the ﬁnancing constraints of SMEs in the euro area.
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3.1. Micro-Level Data
Firm-level information on ﬁnancial conditions in the euro area is provided by SAFE,
from the ECB. The survey covers a wide array of qualitative information on the access
to ﬁnance for non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in Europe; predominantly in the euro area. It is repre-
sentative at the euro-area level, as well as for the four largest countries Germany, France,
Italy, and Spain.
SAFE was started in 2009 and is conducted semi-annually. While 'wave 1' (W1) of
each survey year covers the second and third quarter of that year, 'wave 2' (W2) captures
the fourth quarter of the year and the ﬁrst quarter of the following year. Therefore,
our sample covers the period 2010Q4−2014Q1 (i.e. 2010W2−2013W2). We only include
information starting from 2010W2 because previous waves covered considerably fewer
ﬁrms and relatively more ﬁrms from the largest four euro area countries. Each of the
survey rounds included here covers more than 5,000 ﬁrms. During the period under study,
the survey was conducted in so-called ECB waves and European Commission waves. The
ECB waves cover a limited number of euro area countries, whereas the Commission waves
cover all euro area countries and some surrounding countries.3 Given that we want to make
use of the time dimension in the data, we keep only those countries that are included in
all waves. These are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of
ﬁrms included in our regression sample by country and wave.
To achieve representativeness, the SAFE sample is stratiﬁed by country, ﬁrm size
class, and economic activity. The sample covers the following size classes: micro (1-9
employees), small (10-49 employees), and medium-sized (50-249 employees) enterprises.
For reasons of comparison, a sample of large enterprises (more than 250 employees) is
also included. In terms of economic activity, stratiﬁcation is done at the one-digit level of
3For a detailed overview over the countries covered in the diﬀerent waves, see ECB (2014).
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NACE rev.1.1. Economic activities include the four broad sectoral categories of Industry,
Construction, Trade, and Services.4
Table 2 provides a detailed overview of the distribution of ﬁrms according to diﬀerent
characteristics. With respect to ﬁrm size, three quarters of ﬁrms in the sample employ
less than 50 workers. The most important sectors are Services (37 percent of ﬁrms) and
Trade (28 percent). Interestingly, although the majority of ﬁrms is very small, nearly 80
percent of the ﬁrms are at least 10 years old. Regarding ownership, more than 80 percent
of ﬁrms belong to families or an individual person.
Firms' credit costs. Our main focus is on changes in ﬁrms' cost of external ﬁnancing.
The SAFE data reveal that European SMEs frequently use bank loans as well as overdrafts
and credit lines as a means of external funding. In our sample, an average of about 40
percent of SMEs in the euro area rely on these bank-intermediated funding sources. Again,
reliance on diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments varies signiﬁcantly across countries. Yet, bank
credit and overdrafts rank among the most important external funding sources.
SAFE question Q10, which asks about the ﬁrm's change in loan rates, is used in
order to measure changes in ﬁrms' incurred ﬁnancing costs, applying a dummy variable
that takes on the value of 1 if a ﬁrm experienced an increase in its rates on bank loans,
overdrafts, or credit lines over the previous six months, and zero otherwise. This measure
covers all ﬁrms that have applied for or renewed bank loans over the previous six months.
Thus, SAFE allows us to concentrate on changes in the ﬁnancing conditions for new
loans. In addition, we construct a categorical variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm experienced
a reduction in its loan rates, 2 if the loan rate remained unchanged, and 3 if it went up.
4Industry includes: mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning
supply; water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Trade: wholesale and
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods; and Services: enterprises
in transport and storage; accommodation and food service activities; information and communication;
real estate activities; professional, scientiﬁc and technical activities; administrative and support service
activities; arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities.
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Table 3 provides information on ﬁrms' ﬁnancing conditions by country and across
time. It reveals that, across countries, SMEs are aﬀected quite diﬀerently. While, on
average, 20 percent of German SMEs in our sample report loan rate increases during the
period 2010W2 - 2013W2, nearly 80 percent of Spanish ﬁrms have done so. Overall, small
ﬁrms in the GIIPS-countries have suﬀered much more from loan rate increases than SMEs
in the remaining euro area countries. Regarding the evolution of credit conditions over
time, loan rates increased most broadly in 2011. Since then, fewer ﬁrms have experienced
increasing loan rates. Still, about 30 percent of ﬁrms in our sample report an increase in
credit costs during the 2013Q4 - 2014Q1 period.
3.2. Macro-Level Data
Cross-border credit. To analyze the eﬀects of credit market fragmentation on ﬁrm-
level credit constraints computed using SAFE data, we need semi-annual data on credit
inﬂows into the euro area countries. We retrieve quarterly data and assign the average
of the second and third quarter to 'wave 1' for each year. The average across the fourth
quarter of the current year and ﬁrst quarter of the following year is assigned to 'wave 2',
such that both the ﬁrm-level and the macroeconomic information is timed equivalently.
In order to measure the direct eﬀect of cross-border bank lending on the ﬁnancing sit-
uation of ﬁrms, we need information on the inﬂows of credit to the private non-ﬁnancial
sector for each of the 11 euro area countries included in the sample; ideally this infor-
mation would only concern SMEs. Unfortunately, sectoral breakdowns of cross-border
banking data are still rather scarce. The data closest to our needs are available from the
International Banking Statistics by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). A de-
tailed description of all variables and sources is in the Data Appendix. We use quarterly
country-level information on international bank claims to the non-bank private sector
from the Consolidated Banking Statistics. These claims comprise loans and securities of
all banks reporting to the BIS, consolidated across each bank. Hence, inter-oﬃce po-
sitions are netted out. The non-bank private sector includes private ﬁrms and private
11
  
households, as well as non-bank ﬁnancial institutions like special purpose vehicles, insur-
ance companies, money market funds and the like. To the best of our knowledge, data on
cross-border bank credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are currently not publicly available for our
sample period.5 Thus, we take international bank claims against the private non-bank
sector from the Consolidated Banking Statistics as a proxy.
Besides the direct eﬀects of cross-border lending, a retrenchment in credit market
integration can impact the ﬁnancing conditions of ﬁrms indirectly ; for example via the
funding situation of lenders. In order to evaluate the eﬀects of cross-border credit on
ﬁnancing constraints of SMEs in a broader sense, we use BIS data on total international
bank claims, as well as international claims on banks from the Consolidated Banking
Statistics. Total international bank claims comprise cross-border claims of all reporting
banks against all counterparties (banks, non-bank private sector, public sector) in the
destination country, plus local claims of banks' foreign aﬃliates in foreign currency. Given
that the BIS data is published in current USD, we transform the series into EUR using
nominal exchange rates from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and deﬂate using
consumer price indexes from the IFS to obtain real cross-border bank claims.
Domestic credit. In addition to cross-border credit, we use data on domestic lending as
an explanatory variable. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) present evidence for a "ﬂight home"
eﬀect during the global ﬁnancial crisis: Banks withdrew capital from abroad and tilted
their loan portfolio more toward domestic lending - independent of the fundamentals in
the home country. Due to the ongoing deleveraging and potential ﬁnancial protectionism,
this focus on domestic credit markets may persist in the aftermath of the crisis. Thus, the
reduction in cross-border lending since the crisis may have been compensated in diﬀerent
euro area countries, at least partially, by increased domestic lending.
To control for such changes in the lending behavior of banks, we include domestic bank
5However, the BIS has started to provide such information for the most recent quarters.
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credit to the private non-ﬁnancial sector from the BIS in the regression model. Again, this
series includes domestic credit to private non-ﬁnancial corporations, but also to private
households and non-proﬁt institutions serving households (NPISHs).
Total credit to the private non-ﬁnancial corporations. In order to evaluate how
changes in loan rates are aﬀected by overall credit, we use The Statistics on Credit to
the Private Non-Financial Sector by the BIS. The dataset provides information on total
credit from all sources, i.e. independent of the type or country of origin of the lender.
Total credit data are available for the entire private non-ﬁnancial sector (non-ﬁnancial
corporations, households, and NPISHs), as well as for private non-ﬁnancial corporations
at quarterly frequency. We use the latter series here.
Figure 5 plots the semi-annual growth rates of the diﬀerent credit aggregates. In the
aftermath of the crisis, (real) credit to the private sector declined, on average, in our
sample of 11 euro area countries. The upper panel reveals that, on average, domestic
banks have signiﬁcantly reduced their lending to the private sector - the reductions, as
measured by log-diﬀerences, are more pronounced than the reductions in total credit to
the private sector. When looking at the growth rates of cross-border credit, it appears
that euro area credit markets became increasingly segmented through the beginning of
2013. In particular, cross-border claims on banks in the euro area economies were reduced.
This decline in wholesale funding possibilities of euro area banks has contributed to the
reduction in domestic bank credit. At the end of 2013, a modest increase in cross-border
interbank lending could be observed.
3.3. Regression Model
In order to analyze how credit market segmentation in the euro area aﬀects the external
ﬁnancing costs of SMEs, we proceed as follows. In a ﬁrst step, we use a linked micro-macro
dataset to estimate a pooled probit model where the dependent variable equals one if a
ﬁrm has experienced an increase in its lending rates and zero otherwise. Our explanatory
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variables of interest are diﬀerent credit aggregates. We evaluate the eﬀect of changes in
total credit to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and then consider the eﬀects of changes in domestic
and cross-border bank credit separately. The correlogram of the diﬀerent credit measures
(Table 4) reveals that international bank credit and domestic bank credit to the private
sector are positively (and statistically signiﬁcantly) correlated in our sample of 11 euro
area countries, with a correlation coeﬃcient of .31. This may be a ﬁrst hint at the indirect
channel of international credit market fragmentation: a contraction in cross-border credit
may come with a contraction in domestic bank credit. Moreover, total international credit
is more closely related to movements in cross-border credit to banks than to non-banks,
reﬂecting the importance of the international interbank linkages of European banks.
Credit market segmentation and the ﬁnancing cost of ﬁrms. Using the micro-
macro data set described above, we model the probability of a ﬁrm seeing its loan rate
increase as follows:
Pr[Risct = 1] = αc + θs + λt + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct + γZct + ξXisct + isct (1)
where Risct is a dichotomous variable that equals one if ﬁrm i in country c and sector
s reports a loan rate increase at time t, and zero otherwise, ForCredct is the growth
rate of cross-border credit, and DomCredct is the growth rate of domestic bank credit
to the private sector. Zct is a set of macroeconomic control variables, and Xisct is a set
of ﬁrm covariates to control for observable ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. In addition, country
dummies (αc), sector (θs), and time dummies (λt) are included in each regression to
control for time-invariant country and sector characteristics as well as for common time
trends in the data. Note that we cannot include ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects as many ﬁrms
report to SAFE just once. Dropping all these ﬁrms would signiﬁcantly reduce our sample
size. Therefore, we estimate Eq.(1) using a pooled probit model.
Following the literature, we control for borrower characteristics using information on
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ﬁrm size, age, and ownership structure from SAFE. To control for ﬁrm size, we include
a binary variable into the regression model that equals one for ﬁrms with more than 50
and less than 250 employees (medium-sized ﬁrms) and zero for the smaller ones. We
group micro and small ﬁrms together, as they are similar in terms of ﬁnancing needs and
structures, particularly when thinking about getting credit from foreign banks, relative to
medium sized ﬁrms that are more ﬁnancially sophisticated. For example, medium-sized
ﬁrms take more loans, and loan rates decrease in ﬁrm size. To control for ﬁrm age, we
include a variable that equals one if a ﬁrm is 10 years or older and zero otherwise.
According to previous ﬁndings, we expect a negative link between credit costs and ﬁrm
size and age. Concerning ownership, ﬁrms owned by other ﬁrms or by shareholders are
expected to be less credit constrained than those owned by an individual entrepreneur or a
family. Previous literature has underlined the importance of ﬁrm ownership and ﬁrm age
as determinants of ﬁrms ﬁnancing constraints (Beck et al. 2006, Angelini and Generale
2008). Regarding ownership structure, ﬁrms owned by other ﬁrms may be less ﬁnancially
constrained due to access to internal group funds. The estimations show that ﬁrms owned
by shareholders are aﬀected less by loan rate increases than ﬁrms from the reference
category that includes ﬁrms owned by family, entrepreneurs or private persons. This link
between ﬁrms owned by shareholders and their lower probability of ﬁnancing constraints or
loan rate increases may at least partially be due to the link between ownership structures
and ﬁrm size as Ferrando and Griesshaber (2011) point out.
As we are interested in the eﬀect of a reduction in cross-border credit supply on ﬁrms'
loan rates, one important challenge here is to control for changes in ﬁrms' loan demand.
If loan demand of ﬁrm i increases and this is not controlled for, loan rates may increase
(the loan demand curve shifts out), and our estimates are biased upwards. By contrast, if
loan demand is not controlled for and declines, loan rates tend to decline (as loan demand
shifts inwards) so that our estimates are biased downwards. Following Banerjee (2014),
we include a control variable related to ﬁrms' loan demand, namely a dummy variable
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that equals one if a ﬁrm's most pressing problem is to ﬁnd customers. The idea is that
ﬁrms should have a lower demand for new credit - and hence a lower likelihood of seeing
their credit conditions tightening - if they have diﬃculty in selling their products. We
also include dummies indicating the sector the ﬁrm operates in (Construction, Industry,
Services, Trade) in all regressions, because the previous literature shows that the ﬁrms'
need for external ﬁnancing varies signiﬁcantly by sector (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1998,
Friedrich et al. 2013). In the robustness tests below, we also include sector-time dummies
to control for changes in loan demand at the sector-level.
In terms of macroeconomic control variables, we include aggregate deposit rates, coun-
tries' interbank dependence, and the change in the number of banks in order to control
for common banking system characteristics. All these variables are retrieved from the
ECB Data Warehouse. We expect a higher probability of a loan rate increase for ﬁrms in
countries with higher deposit rates, a higher degree of interbank dependence, and a larger
reduction in the number of banks. Higher interbank dependence can aggravate the fund-
ing situation of domestic banks in times of stress in the banking sector. This can lead to
lower lending and higher lending rates. Banking systems that rely less on interbank fund-
ing and more on other types of liabilities like customer deposits are funded more solidly
and hence can charge more stable lending rates. The interbank dependence variable can
be seen as a control variable for the wholesale funding situation of banks here. Moreover,
we add an indicator of economic risk. As banks have adjusted their risk perceptions in
the realm of the crisis, this may imply that they charged higher risk premia and, hence,
loan rates for SME loans. The economic risk indicator is available from the International
Country Risk Guide, a proprietary database that is also used by ﬁrms and banks to assess
business risks. It includes information on GDP per capita, GDP growth, inﬂation, as well
as the budget balance and the current account relative to GDP. In addition, we include
5-year sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads to control for diﬀerences in sovereign
risk, given that our sample period includes the European sovereign debt crisis. These data
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are retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream.6 Table 5 presents summary statistics
for all variables included in the regression sample.
One problem with this type of micro-macro data and the non-linear probit regression
model is determining the appropriate level at which to cluster standard errors. The
observational unit in our data set is the ﬁrm, which is nested within sectors and countries.
Ideally, we would like to cluster at the broadest level, i.e. the country level. However,
cluster-robust estimation relies on the number of clusters going to inﬁnity (Cameron
and Miller 2015). As the number of countries in our sample is small (as is the number of
sectors), we cluster at the ﬁrm level. Yet, in robustness tests, we check how the signiﬁcance
of our results is aﬀected when clustering at the country level.
Running a simple pooled probit model on ﬁrms' loan conditions means that we look
at ﬁrms that actually applied for and were granted credit. This implies a non-random
selection of ﬁrms into our regression sample, leading to potentially biased estimates. Firms
that did not apply for a loan  either because they were discouraged or because they
did not need a new loan  may have seen larger increases in loan rates than ﬁrms that
received new credit, e.g. due to high ﬁxed costs of using bank credit. In order to take this
potential downward bias of our estimates into account, we also estimate a probit model
with Heckman selection (van de Ven and van Praag 1981), i.e. a two-step estimator that
controls for sample selection.
Similar to Popov and Udell (2012) and Beck et al. (2014), we model a ﬁrm's decision
to participate in the credit market using a dichotomous variable that equals one if a ﬁrm
has applied for a loan and zero otherwise. In the ﬁrst-stage of the Heckman procedure,
the selection equation, we regress this dichotomous loan application variable on all regres-
6We also added net interest margins, ﬁnancial risk, and the ratio of total credit to the private sector
relative to GDP to all regressions. Credit to GDP is often used as a measure of ﬁnancial development in
large country samples. Yet, it is also a measure of the degree of debt ﬁnancing and, hence, leverage in
an economy. Including theses additional macro-variables leads to a very high degree of multicollinearity
though. That is why we opt for the more parsimonious speciﬁcation here.
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sors included in the baseline Eq.(1), as well as on two additional variables, the so-called
exclusion restrictions. Credible identiﬁcation rests on including at least one variable, i.e.
one exclusion restriction, into the selection equation that has a non-zero eﬀect on the
selection variable (loan demand), but not on the outcome variable, i.e. the dependent
variable in the actual regression of interest (loan rate increase). The ﬁrst additional vari-
able in our selection equation equals one if a ﬁrm reports its most pressing problem to be
competition, and zero otherwise. The second exclusion restriction is based on a variable
that takes on a value of one if a ﬁrm's most pressing problem is high labor input costs.
We expect a negative link between both the competition and the labor cost variable
based on the following reasoning: stronger or increasing competitive pressure can reduce a
ﬁrm's expectation about its future growth. For example, when more ﬁrms are active in the
market and compete for product demand, it becomes more diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to expand
turnover, especially during times of weak aggregate demand. Based on a theoretical
model of demand for credit lines, Martin and Santomero (1997) show that ﬁrms with
lower growth perspectives have lower credit demand. Looking at the link between our
competition variable and a ﬁrm's expected growth over the next two years (see SAFE
question Q17), we see a negative and statistically signiﬁcant correlation in our sample.
A similar intuition can be evoked for ﬁrms reporting their most pressing problem to
be labor and production costs. If input costs become the most important issue, growth
perspectives of the ﬁrm can be hampered, as it gets harder for the ﬁrm to sell its products
at a price that is low enough to allow for expansion. Again, we see a negative and
signiﬁcant correlation between ﬁrms expected growth and our labor cost variable. Hence,
it seems plausible that ﬁrms that report their most pressing problem to be input costs have
lower growth expectations and hence demand less credit. In addition, Banerjee (2014)
also ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of input cost on loan demand of ﬁrms, based on the size of new
loans from the SAFE-data.
Diﬀerential eﬀects: The role of ﬁrm size. In addition to estimating Eq.(1) with the
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probit approach discussed above, we analyze whether ﬁrms of diﬀerent size are aﬀected
diﬀerently by credit market fragmentation. To that aim, we interact all credit variables
with an indicator variable that equals one if a ﬁrms has more than 50 employees (Sizeisct),
and is, hence, classiﬁed as a medium-sized ﬁrm, and zero otherwise:
Pr[Risct = 1] = αc + θs + λt + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct (2)
+ β3ForCredct · Sizeisct + β4DomCredct · Sizeisct
+ γZct + ξXisct + isct
Note that the interaction variable, Sizeisct, is always included individually in the regres-
sions and is subsumed under the term Xisct. Even if larger ﬁrms are expected to have
more favorable ﬁnancing conditions than smaller ﬁrms that are inherently more opaque
and risky, credit market fragmentation may aﬀect the larger ﬁrms in our sample more
than smaller ones due to potential direct linkages to foreign banks or larger reliance on
bank credit in general.
4. Estimation Results
4.1. Credit Growth and Financing Costs of SMEs
Before coming to the eﬀects of credit market fragmentation on loan rate increases for
SMEs, let us look at the ﬁrst-stage selection equation. Table 6 reveals that medium-
sized ﬁrms are more likely to apply for a loan than small ones. Furthermore, ﬁrms that
are owned by shareholders are less likely to apply for a bank loan, probably due to the
fact that they can resort to other means of ﬁnancing. As expected, ﬁrms facing strong
competition, high labor costs, or weak demand for their products are less likely to apply
for credit. Turning to the macroeconomic control variables, ﬁrms in countries with a
higher interbank dependence are more likely to send out a loan application. We also ﬁnd
some evidence that ﬁrms in countries with higher CDS spreads are less likely to apply for
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loans.
Table 7 presents the regression results for the increase in loan rates as the dependent
variable. Larger ﬁrms, ﬁrms owned by shareholders, and ﬁrms that have great diﬃ-
culty in ﬁnding customers are less likely to experience loan rate rises. Regarding the
macroeconomic drivers of ﬁrms' credit costs, ﬁrms from countries with higher interbank
dependence are more likely to experience loan rate increases. As expected, the higher the
average deposit rate and, hence, banks' funding costs or the higher the economic risk at
the country-level, the higher the probability of a loan rate increase for a given ﬁrm. The
larger the reduction in the number of banks serving a ﬁrm's home country and, hence,
the lower contestability in the credit market, the higher is the probability of a loan rate
increase.
Regarding the diﬀerent credit measures, we ﬁnd that larger reductions in total credit
to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms make loan rate increases more likely − both in the probit model and
in the model with Heckmann selection (columns 1 and 2). When considering domestic
and cross-border credit separately, we ﬁnd that only international bank credit growth has
a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of increasing loan rates for
SMEs. The direct eﬀect of domestic credit growth is statistically insigniﬁcant. Columns
5 and 6 reveal that the negative eﬀect of cross-border credit is driven by cross-border
interbank loans: the stronger the reduction in cross-border credit to banks, the higher
the probability of increasing loan rates. By contrast, changes in cross-border credit to
non-banks do not seem to matter for changes in the ﬁnancing costs of SMEs. This may be
due to the fact that direct foreign lending is less important for SMEs' external ﬁnancing
situation than lending by domestic banks. Moreover, this credit aggregate includes not
only cross-border credit to SMEs, but also to non-bank ﬁnancials and households, for
example. Hence, the estimated coeﬃcient on this variable should be interpreted with
some caution. Overall, credit market fragmentation in the interbank market seems to
have a more detrimental eﬀect on the ﬁnancing costs of SMEs than the reduction in
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direct cross-border lending to ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is in line with the empirical results of
Iyer et al. (2014) for Portugal.
Figure 6 plots average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for diﬀerent credit aggregates,
based on the regression models using the Heckman selection approach. It illustrates that
the probability of ﬁrms seeing their loan rates increase is higher, the larger the reduction
in credit is - both for total and for the international credit variables.
Table 8 presents the regression results for interactions between the credit variables
and the ﬁrm size dummy variable that equals one for ﬁrms with more than 50 employees,
i.e. medium-sized ﬁrms. Again, the relation between credit growth and ﬁrms' likeli-
hood of loan rate increases is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction terms between larger ﬁrms and total credit, international credit and interna-
tional credit to banks is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.7 As illustrated by Figure
7, medium-sized ﬁrms have a lower likelihood of loan rate increases than small ﬁrms in
countries where cross-border credit growth was not too negative. Yet, when credit signif-
icantly decreases (by more than 10%), large ﬁrms have a higher probability of loan rate
increases than small ones - possibly because in the case of heavy credit market stress,
larger ﬁrms are more likely to apply for and be granted credit than smaller ones that are
more opaque and thus less likely to receive credit in times of banking sector stress. Loan
rates charged to applicant ﬁrms are likely to be high in this environment.
4.2. Economic Signiﬁcance
In order to get an idea about the magnitudes of the above identiﬁed linkages between
credit growth and the probability of loan rate increases, we now discuss and interpret the
marginal eﬀects from our regressions in greater detail. Given that the probit estimator
7As stressed by Williams (2012), given that the value of the interaction changes with changes in the
components only, no marginal eﬀect of the interaction itself exists, but just the marginal eﬀect of the
component terms.
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is non-linear, the marginal eﬀects of the independent variables in the model are non-
constant. They vary with changes in the predictors.
When considering an average ﬁrm in an average credit market (all variables are set at
their sample means), our results indicate that the probability of a loan rate increase faced
by this ﬁrm is 67% in the 2010 - 2014 period (based on the model from column 2, Table
7).8 Yet, this probability rises by 10 percentage points, up to 77%, if total credit growth
is at the sample minimum (-.07) and all other predictors remain at the sample means.
If total credit growth is at its maximum (.04), the probability of an average ﬁrm seeing
its loan rate increase drops to 60% though. Overall, the probability of facing higher loan
rates varies by 17 percentage points, depending on total credit growth in the country the
ﬁrm operates in.
Repeating the same exercise for the eﬀect of international credit growth, our results
indicate similar eﬀects: Here, the diﬀerence between the likelihood of loan rate increases
in countries with the highest (.23) and the lowest growth (-.32) in international credit is 15
percentage points. Thus, the eﬀect of a retrenchment in international credit on ﬁrms' loan
rates is not only statistically, but also economically meaningful. Further, when comparing
these marginal eﬀects to those of ﬁrm-level characteristics, the impact of credit growth
is important. For example, when computing marginal eﬀects across the diﬀerent ﬁrm
sizes (small, medium sized) and keeping all other variables at their sample means, the
probability of ﬁrm-level loan rate increases varies between 65 and 68% only.
4.3. Robustness Tests
We run several alternative regressions in order to test the robustness of the results
discussed above. Table 9 shows that adding a control group for large ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with
more than 250 employees, does not weaken our main results. Rather, it strengthens the
8We base our discussion of marginal eﬀects on our preferred regression setup with Heckman selection
here. However, the results based on the simple probit model are qualitatively the same.
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result that the retrenchment in cross-border bank credit negatively aﬀects, in particular,
larger ﬁrms' cost of credit in the sample. Furthermore, dropping individual ﬁrm-level
variables from the model or including a set of sector-and-time dummies does not aﬀect
our results.9 Moreover, when clustering robust standard errors at the country level in-
stead of at the ﬁrm level, our results remain statistically signiﬁcant. Changes in inﬂation
are not explicitly considered by ﬁrms reporting loan rate changes. In order to rule out
that our results are driven by changes in inﬂation, we include CPI inﬂation as an addi-
tional regressor. As expected, the estimation results reveal that if inﬂation rises, nominal
interest rates on new loans are more likely to also rise, although the results are mostly not
statistically signiﬁcant. Still, the introduction of CPI inﬂation in the regression model
does not alter our previous ﬁndings.
Second, we run ordered probit regressions where the dependent categorical variable is
assigned a value of 1 if a ﬁrm's loan rate decreased over the past six months, a value of 2
if the loan rate was unchanged, and a value of 3 if the loan rate increased. The ordered
probit regressions support our previous results that reductions in aggregate credit make
loan rate increases more likely (and loan rate reductions less likely). Moreover, in this
setup, the relationship between cross-border credit to non-banks and the likelihood of
loan rate increases at the ﬁrm-level is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, when
diﬀerentiating between positive and negative loan rate changes, the estimation results
suggest that fragmentation in the international market for credit to non-banks coincides
with increased external ﬁnancing costs for SMEs - even if direct foreign credit is not as
important for SMEs as domestic credit.
Third, we aggregate SAFE-data for each country at the sector-level and estimate the
following aggregate version of Eq.(1) using a fractional probit model, where the dependent
9We do not report all the robustness tests. The respective tables are available from the authors upon
request.
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variable is bounded between zero and one:
ShareRsct = αc + θs + λt + υst + β1ForCredct + β2DomCredct + γZct + sct (3)
ShareRsct is the share of ﬁrms in sector s and country c at time t that reported a loan
rate increase. All time-varying, sector-speciﬁc factors, like changes in credit demand or
sectoral business conditions, are controlled for by sector-time ﬁxed eﬀects (υst). As in the
baseline speciﬁcation, we also add sector, time, and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Apart from this,
we include the same time-varying country-level variables as in the baseline regressions.
While some of the macroeconomic control variables do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
sectoral share of ﬁrms with higher ﬁnancing costs, Table 10 conﬁrms our previous results
that a retrenchment in international credit leads to a deterioration of ﬁrms' borrowing
costs. The sectoral version of the regression model corroborates the role of the interbank
channel for ﬁrms' ﬁnancing costs.
Fourth, we have tested the robustness of our results when dropping macroeconomic
control variables. In unreported regressions, we ﬁnd that our results, especially those
concerning the credit aggregates, remain qualitatively unchanged and even become statis-
tically more signiﬁcant compared to our baseline speciﬁcation. In addition, the negative
coeﬃcient on domestic credit turns statistically signiﬁcant when dropping other banking-
sector characteristics like interbank dependence and the deposit rate. All ﬁndings related
to international credit growth remain unchanged
Finally, we evaluate endogeneity issues. Our ﬁndings point to a negative link between
aggregate credit growth and the probability of loan rate increases at the ﬁrm-level. It is
unlikely that this result is driven by reverse causality, because increasing loan rates in a
destination country of credit should make it more attractive for banks to lend. Thus, we
would expect the eﬀect of loan rate increases on credit growth to be positive or insignif-
icant. Moreover, individual ﬁrm-level developments should not drive aggregate variables
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(Langﬁeld and Pagano 2016), especially when looking at small ﬁrms.
Potential instrumental variables for cross-border credit, like changes in the regulation
of foreign bank entry, institutional changes, or creditor rights, are very similar in the
countries considered here and do not vary much across the period 2010-2014. Still, we
check whether categorical variables measuring the implementation of stricter capital and
other regulatory requirements, taken from the prudential policy database developed by
Cerutti et al. (2016), could be used to instrument aggregate credit variables in our sample.
After selecting those potential instruments that do not seem to suﬀer from a weak instru-
ments problem, we test for the exogeneity of the potentially endogenous credit aggregates.
Yet, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, so that the probit model without
instrumenting aggregate credit is the preferred speciﬁcation here.
5. Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to shed light on real consequences of credit market fragmen-
tation in the euro area since the crisis. SMEs in the euro area continue to receive special
attention from policy makers, not least with regard to the design of the Capital Markets
Union (CMU), as they were hit the hardest by the credit crunch during the crisis.
So far, the literature on the ﬁnancing constraints of ﬁrms in the euro area concentrates
on the importance of ﬁrm characteristics for credit conditions of ﬁrms. Yet, it is not yet
investigated how the structural changes in cross-border banking aﬀect the access of SMEs
to ﬁnance. This study is a ﬁrst step in ﬁlling this gap. Using a linked micro-macro panel
data set, we examine the link between the retrenchment in cross-border bank lending and
the evolution of ﬁnancing costs for SMEs in the euro area.
Our paper has three main ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd that reductions in cross-border bank
lending made loan rate increases for SMEs more likely. The eﬀects are meaningful, both
in statistical and in economic terms. For ﬁrms in countries with the strongest reductions
in international credit, the probability of facing higher loan rates is 15 percentage points
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higher than for ﬁrms in countries with the most favorable evolution of international credit.
Second, the larger the retrenchment in cross-border lending to banks was, the higher the
likelihood that SMEs saw their credit costs rise. Thus, the negative link between total
cross-border credit growth and the ﬁnancing costs for ﬁrms seems to be driven by the
interbank lending channel. Yet, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and consistent eﬀect of direct
cross-border lending to non-banks on SMEs ﬁnancing costs. Third, we can show that, in
particular, the medium-sized European enterprises included here have suﬀered from the
fragmentation of international credit markets.
Overall, our results show that cross-border lending does indeed aﬀect the access to
ﬁnance for SMEs, though mostly indirectly through the interbank channel. To alleviate
ﬁnancing constraints for SMEs, one important factor is thus credit market integration.
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Figures
Figure 1: New loans to non-ﬁnancial companies
This ﬁgure plots new loans granted to non-ﬁnancial companies (in billion USD). The data are available
from the MFI Interest Rate Statistics by the ECB. q denotes quarters.
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Figure 2: Change in the availability of bank loans for SMEs
This ﬁgure plots the net weighted percentage of responses (increased availability minus decreased avail-
ability). The data are available from SAFE by the ECB. W denotes the waves of the survey. While 'wave
1' (W1) of each survey year covers the second and third quarter of that year, 'wave 2' (W2) captures the
fourth quarter of the year and the ﬁrst quarter of the following year. Therefore, our sample covers the
period 2010Q4−2014Q1 (i.e. 2010W2−2013W2).
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Figure 3: Loan rate spreads in the euro area
This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerence between interest rates on small and large loans (percentage points) in the
euro area. The data are available from the MFI Interest Rate Statistics by the ECB.
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Figure 4: Firms' most pressing problem
This ﬁgure plots the most pressing problem named by ﬁrms in SAFE (weighted). The euro area sample
includes the 11 countries used in this paper. Representative country-level results are available for France,
Germany, Spain, and Italy. W denotes the waves of the survey. While 'wave 1' (W1) of each survey year
covers the second and third quarter of that year, 'wave 2' (W2) captures the fourth quarter of the year
and the ﬁrst quarter of the following year. Therefore, our sample covers the period 2010Q4−2014Q1 (i.e.
2010W2−2013W2).
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Figure 5: Log-changes in real credit
This ﬁgure plots the sample means of the change in total, domestic and cross-border credit. All credit
series are available from the BIS. The timing of the variables corresponds to the SAFE waves. W denotes
the waves of the survey. While 'wave 1' (W1) of each survey year covers the second and third quarter
of that year, 'wave 2' (W2) captures the fourth quarter of the year and the ﬁrst quarter of the following
year. Therefore, our sample covers the period 2010Q4−2014Q1 (i.e. 2010W2−2013W2).
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Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of a loan rate increase, by international credit growth
This ﬁgure plots the average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for diﬀerent values of total and international
credit growth, based on Table 7, columns (2) and (4), respectively. The gray areas reﬂect 95% conﬁdence
bands.
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Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of a loan rate increase for small and medium-sized ﬁrms
This ﬁgure plots the average adjusted predictions (AAPs) for diﬀerent values of international credit
growth, based on Table 8, column (4) in the paper, i.e. on the regression model where interactions
between ﬁrm size and credit growth are taken into consideration.
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Tables
Table 1: SAFE country composition
This table gives the number of ﬁrms by year and wave in our sample.
Year and wave
Country 2010W2 2011W1 2011W2 2012W1 2012W2 2013W1 2013W2
Austria 393 363 349 370 372 376 347
Belgium 410 399 414 395 402 397 414
Germany 792 661 683 711 641 649 644
Finland 432 442 416 349 384 373 371
France 784 774 760 767 736 762 783
Greece 362 418 397 361 356 325 362
Ireland 381 355 344 338 352 354 370
Italy 753 685 659 734 621 686 655
Netherlands 401 402 404 381 383 378 393
Portugal 400 406 399 394 410 383 347
Spain 721 706 699 709 699 705 699
Total 5,829 5,611 5,524 5,509 5,356 5,388 5,385
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Table 2: Firm characteristics
This table gives the number of ﬁrms according to diﬀerent ﬁrm characteristics provided by SAFE.
Frequency Percent
Employment (categories)
From 1 employee to 9 employees 14,514 37.60
From 10 employees to 49 employees 14,533 37.65
From 50 employees to 249 employees 9,555 24.75
Main activity
Industry 9,622 24.93
Construction 4,125 10.69
Trade 10,715 27.76
Services 14,140 36.63
Age of the ﬁrm
10 years or more 30,556 79.16
5 years or more but less than 10 years 5,176 13.41
2 years or more but less than 5 years 2,409 6.24
Less than 2 years 461 1.19
Main owner of the ﬁrm
Public shareholders, as your company is 1,109 2.87
Family or entrepreneurs 21,939 56.83
Other ﬁrms or business associates 3,915 10.14
Venture capital ﬁrms or business angel 443 1.15
A natural person, one owner only 10,564 27.37
Other 632 1.64
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Table 3: Loan rate increases by country and time
This table presents the share of ﬁrms that have experienced loan rate increases in our sample.
Year and wave
Country 2010W2 2011W1 2011W2 2012W1 2012W2 2013W1 2013W2 Total
Austria 0.44 0.65 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.27 0.37
Belgium 0.57 0.47 0.42 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.23 0.37
Finland 0.46 0.30 0.26 0.44 0.60 0.77 0.52 0.49
France 0.46 0.59 0.51 0.23 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.34
Germany 0.37 0.44 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.20
Greece 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.66 0.47 0.55 0.34 0.67
Ireland 0.73 0.82 0.64 0.52 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.57
Italy 0.61 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.68 0.61 0.52 0.68
Netherlands 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.43 0.68 0.38 0.27 0.46
Portugal 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.27 0.62
Spain 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.45 0.77
Total 0.57 0.66 0.55 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.47
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Table 4: Correlogram: Log-change in credit measures
This table presents correlations between the log-diﬀerence of diﬀerent credit measures. The ﬁrst row of
each credit measure reports the correlation coeﬃcient. ∗ denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5%-level.
The second row shows p-values, while the third row reports the number of observations.
Total credit to
ﬁrms
Domestic bank
credit to private
sector
Total interna-
tional claims
International
claims to non-
banks
Domestic bank credit
0.25* 1
(0.03)
77 77
Total international claims
0.08 0.31* 1
(0.47) (0.01)
77 77 77
Int. claims to non-banks
0.06 0.10 0.41* 1
(0.63) (0.37) (0.00)
77 77 77 77
Int. claims to banks
0.01 0.24* 0.80* 0.02
(0.94) (0.03) (0.00) (0.88)
77 77 77 77
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Table 5: Summary statistics
This table gives summary statistics for the baseline regression sample.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Sample of ﬁrms with information on loan rate changes
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 14,395 0.31 0.46 0 1
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 14,395 0.80 0.40 0 1
Turnover 14,395 1.74 0.77 1 3
Ownership 14,395 0.13 0.34 0 1
Most pressing pb: Finding customers 14,395 0.21 0.41 0 1
Most pressing pb: Labor cost 14,395 0.14 0.35 0 1
Most pressing pb: Competition 14,395 0.11 0.31 0 1
Deposit rate, % 14,395 2.52 0.63 1.03 4.51
Interbank dependence, % of assets 14,395 14.39 6.31 6.64 31.14
Growth in number of banks 14,395 -3.71 6.35 -32.00 2.50
Economic risk 14,395 -35.98 3.50 -43.71 -26.50
CDS Spread 14,395 7.03 25.72 0.12 149.04
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ 14,395 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.04
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ 14,395 -0.02 0.03 -0.14 0.06
Total international credit, log-diﬀ 14,395 -0.03 0.08 -0.32 0.23
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ 14,395 -0.02 0.07 -0.37 0.14
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ 14,395 -0.05 0.20 -1.01 1.11
Full sample
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 38,602 0.25 0.43 0 1
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 38,602 0.79 0.41 0 1
Turnover 38,602 1.62 0.75 1 3
Ownership 38,602 0.15 0.35 0 1
Most pressing pb: Finding customers 38,602 0.24 0.43 0 1
Most pressing pb: Labor cost 38,602 0.14 0.34 0 1
Most pressing pb: Competition 38,602 0.13 0.34 0 1
Deposit rate, % 38,602 2.50 0.66 1.03 4.51
Interbank dependence, % of assets 38,602 14.80 6.66 6.64 31.14
Growth in number of banks 38,602 -3.79 6.47 -32.00 2.50
Economic risk 38,602 -36.29 3.74 -43.71 -26.50
CDS Spread 38,602 8.26 28.91 0.12 149.04
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ 38,602 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.04
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ 38,602 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.06
Total international credit, log-diﬀ 38,602 -0.03 0.09 -0.32 0.23
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ 38,602 -0.02 0.07 -0.37 0.14
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ 38,602 -0.05 0.22 -1.01 1.11
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Table 6: Determinants of loan applications
This table reports estimation results (average marginal eﬀects) from the ﬁrst-stage estimation of a probit
with selection. The dependent variable equals 1 if a ﬁrm has applied for a loan. Credit aggregates are
expressed as log-diﬀerences. A set of country, sector, and time dummies is included in each regression.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3)
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ownership -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.102***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Most pressing pb: Competition -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.113***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Most pressing pb: Labor cost -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Deposit rate, % -0.015 -0.016 -0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Growth in number of banks -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
CDS spread -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ 0.447**
(0.174)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ 0.159 0.108
(0.143) (0.145)
Total international credit, log-diﬀ -0.007
(0.040)
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ -0.075
(0.047)
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ 0.008
(0.014)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes
Observations 38602 38602 38602
No. of ﬁrms 26032 26032 26032
Pseudo R-squared 0.0574 0.0573 0.0574
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Table 7: Determinants of loan rate increases
This table reports estimation results (average marginal eﬀects) from pooled probit regressions, with and
without a Heckman selection approach. The dependent variable equals 1 if a ﬁrm reports an increase
in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are expressed as log-diﬀerences. A set of country, sector and time
dummies is included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. ∗,∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 0.011 -0.020** 0.011 -0.020** 0.011 -0.020**
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.007
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Ownership -0.033*** -0.011 -0.033*** -0.011 -0.033*** -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.030*** -0.005 -0.032*** -0.006 -0.032*** -0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Deposit rate, % 0.042** 0.043*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.062*** 0.060***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.006* 0.009** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Growth in number of banks -0.003*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.011** 0.018*** 0.013***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CDS spread -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ -1.545*** -1.515***
(0.272) (0.259)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ -0.196 -0.223 -0.095 -0.119
(0.241) (0.221) (0.244) (0.225)
Total international credit, log-diﬀ -0.281*** -0.248***
(0.067) (0.062)
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ -0.124 -0.089
(0.077) (0.072)
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ -0.069*** -0.064***
(0.023) (0.021)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395
No. of ﬁrms 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.087 0.168 0.086 0.168 0.086
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Table 8: Determinants of loan rate increases, interactions with ﬁrm size
This table reports estimation results (coeﬃcient estimates) from pooled probit regressions, with and
without a Heckman selection approach. The dependent variable equals 1 if a ﬁrm reports an increase
in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are expressed as log-diﬀerences. A set of country, sector, and time
dummies is included in each regression. Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. ∗,∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 0.004 -0.090*** -0.011 -0.103*** -0.002 -0.094***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034)
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 0.032 0.022 0.032 0.021 0.031 0.021
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Ownership -0.098*** -0.031 -0.100*** -0.031 -0.100*** -0.031
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.093*** -0.014 -0.096*** -0.016 -0.096*** -0.016
(0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032)
Deposit rate, % 0.126** 0.132*** 0.223*** 0.220*** 0.188*** 0.187***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.050)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.028** 0.018* 0.027** 0.018*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Growth in number of banks -0.010*** -0.008** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Economic risk 0.063*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.033** 0.056*** 0.041***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
CDS spread -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ -3.810*** -3.919***
(0.903) (0.849)
Total credit to ﬁrms x Larger ﬁrms -3.315*** -2.916**
(1.209) (1.142)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ -0.304 -0.520 0.021 -0.187
(0.773) (0.723) (0.782) (0.732)
Total credit by domestic banks x Larger ﬁrms -1415 -0.945 -1327 -0.829
(0.976) (0.925) (0.986) (0.935)
Total international credit, log-diﬀ -0.645*** -0.562***
(0.219) (0.204)
Total international credit x Larger ﬁrms -0.797*** -0.800***
(0.309) (0.289)
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ -0.289 -0.184
(0.262) (0.246)
International credit to non-banks x Larger ﬁrms -0.246 -0.249
(0.350) (0.327)
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ -0.134* -0.116
(0.077) (0.072)
International credit to banks x Larger ﬁrms -0.292** -0.328***
(0.127) (0.119)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395 14395
No. of ﬁrms 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825 10825
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.087 0.169 0.087 0.168 0.087
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Table 9: Determinants of loan rate increases, including large ﬁrms
This table reports estimation results (average marginal eﬀects) from pooled probit regressions, including
large ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with more than 250 employees), with and without a Heckman selection approach.
The dependent variable equals 1 if a ﬁrm reports an increase in its loan rate. Credit aggregates are
expressed as log-diﬀerences. A set of country, sector, and time dummies is included in each regression.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm-level. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the
10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm size (1:medium-sized) 0.011 -0.019* 0.011 -0.019** 0.011 -0.019**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Firm age (1:more than 10 years) 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Ownership -0.035*** -0.012 -0.035*** -0.012 -0.035*** -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Most pressing pb: Finding customers -0.029*** -0.005 -0.031*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.006
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Deposit rate, % 0.037** 0.037** 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.057***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.005 0.008** 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Growth in number of banks -0.003*** -0.003** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic risk 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.011** 0.019*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
CDS spread -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ -1.693*** -1.687***
(0.262) (0.251)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ -0.234 -0.267 -0.117 -0.151
(0.233) (0.216) (0.236) (0.219)
Total international credit, log-diﬀ -0.317*** -0.290***
(0.064) (0.061)
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ -0.134* -0.109
(0.074) (0.069)
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ -0.078*** -0.073***
(0.022) (0.021)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 15645 15645 15645 15645 15645 15645
No. of ﬁrms 11727 11727 11727 11727 11727 11727
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.05 0.169 0.05 0.169 0.05
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Table 10: Determinants of loan rate increases, sector level
This table reports estimation results from fractional probit regressions. The dependent variable is the
share of ﬁrms in sector s, country c at time t that report an increase in loan rates. Credit aggregates
are expressed as log-diﬀerences. A set of country, sector, time and sector-time dummies is included in
each regression. Estimations are conducted using robust standard errors. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, and 1%-level.
(1) (2) (3)
Deposit rate, % 0.069 0.12 0.093
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082)
Interbank dependence, % of assets 0.035** 0.021 0.021
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Growth in number of banks -0.007 -0.016*** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Economic risk 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.074***
(0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
CDS Spread 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total credit to ﬁrms, log-diﬀ -4.339***
(1.179)
Total credit by domestic banks to private, log-diﬀ -1.014 -0.667
(1.029) (1.088)
Total international credit, log-diﬀ -0.920***
(0.244)
International credit to non-banks, log-diﬀ -0.123
(0.368)
International credit to banks, log-diﬀ -0.202**
(0.086)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Wave dummies yes yes yes
Sector-wave dummies yes yes yes
Observations 308 308 308
No. of countries 11 11 11
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.133 0.132
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Data Appendix
Variable Source Description
Costs of ﬁnancing
Increase in lending rates
SAFE 1: increased
Q10, a): Have lending rates for your
ﬁrms increased, decreased or remained
the same over the past 6 months?
missing: DK/NA
0: otherwise
Firm characteristics
Firm size
SAFE
D1: How many people does your com-
pany employ(part- or full time)?
1: 50 - 249 employees
0: 10 - 49 employees
Firm age
SAFE
D5: In which year was your ﬁrm regis-
tered?
1: 10 years or more
0: less than 10 years
Sector
SAFE Categorical variable
D3: What is the main activity of your
company?
1: Construction
2: Industry (Mining, Manufacturing)
3: Services (Transport, Real Estate,
Other Services)
4: Trade (Wholesale and Retail)
Missing: D3>7
Firm ownership
SAFE 1: Shareholders, other ﬁrms, other
D6: Who are the owners of your ﬁrm? 0: family or entrepreneurs, venture capi-
tal ﬁrms, natural person, one owner only
missing: DK/NA
Most pressing problem: ﬁnding customers
SAFE 1: Finding customers
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Access to ﬁnance,
competition, costs of production or la-
bor, availability of skilled stuﬀ or experi-
enced managers, regulation, other)
Q0: What is currently your most press-
ing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
Most pressing problem: input costs
SAFE 1: Costs of production or labour
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Finding cus-
tomers, competition, access to ﬁnance,
availability of skilled stuﬀ or experienced
managers, regulation, other)
Q0: What is currently your most press-
ing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
Most pressing problem: competition
SAFE 1: Competition
Waves until 2012W1 0: all other categories (Finding cus-
tomers, access to ﬁnance, availability of
skilled stuﬀ or experienced managers,
regulation, costs of production or labor,
other)
Q0: What is currently your most press-
ing problem?
missing: DK/NA and missings from Q0
Waves as of 2012W2
Construct Q0 from Q0b and Q0c
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Total credit
Total credit to private
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
BIS, Statistics on credit to the private
non-ﬁnancial sector
Credit to non-ﬁnancial corporations
from all sources independent of the
country of origin or type of lender. This
includes e.g. securitised credits held by
the non-bank ﬁnancial sector or cross-
border lending. The coverage of ﬁnancial
instruments includes loans and debt se-
curities. Adjusted for breaks, billions of
local currency (EUR), original frequency:
quarterly
Cross-border credit
Total international
cross-border bank claims
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims (amounts outstanding at quar-
ter end) on destination country by all
reporting countries, immediate borrower
basis, in mio. USD, international
claims (cross-border + local in foreign
currency), original frequency: quarterly
International cross-
border bank claims on
non-bank private
sector
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims on destination country by all re-
porting countries, immediate borrower
basis, in mio. USD, international claims
(cross-border + local in foreign cur-
rency), non-bank private sector includes
claims against all non-banks (i.e. includ-
ing ﬁnancial non-banks and households),
original frequency: quarterly
International cross-
border bank claims on
banking sector
BIS, Consolidated Banking Statistics Claims on destination country banks by
all reporting countries, immediate bor-
rower basis, in mio. USD, foreign claims
(cross-border + local in foreign cur-
rency), original frequency: quarterly
Domestic credit
Domestic bank credit to
private non-ﬁnancial
sector (non-ﬁnancial
corporations, house-
holds, NPISHs)
BIS, Statistics on credit to the private
non-ﬁnancial sector
Credit extended by domestic deposit-
taking corporations except the central
bank such as commercial banks, sav-
ings banks or credit unions and money-
market funds, adjusted for breaks, bil-
lions of local currency (EUR), original
frequency: quarterly.
Other macro variables
Euro-Dollar nominal ex-
change rate
IMF, IFS Euro per USD, end of period, original fre-
quency: quarterly
Consumer price index IMF, IFS All items, index 2010 = 100, original fre-
quency: quarterly
Gross domestic product Eurostat In current mio EUR, according to ESTV
2010, original frequency: quarterly
Deposit interest rate ECB, MFI Interest Rate Statistics Interest rate on deposits with agreed
maturity, annualized agreed rate, coun-
terpart sector: non-ﬁnancial corpora-
tions and households, original frequency:
monthly
Interbank dependence ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking
Data
Interbank market dependence in % of to-
tal assets, domestic banks and foreign
controlled subsidiaries and branches,
original frequency: half-yearly
Number of banks ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking
Data
Total number of credit institutions, do-
mestic banks and foreign controlled
subsidiaries and branches, original fre-
quency: half-yearly
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Economic risk International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), PRS Group
Economic risk rating, based on diﬀer-
ent risk components (GDP per capita,
GDP growth, inﬂation, ﬁscal budget bal-
ance, current account balance), original
frequency: yearly
CDS spreads Thomson Reiters Datastream 5-year sovereign credit default swap
spreads, original frequency: daily
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Highlights 
1. We look at the real consequences of credit market fragmentation in the euro area. 
2. We examine the link between cross-border bank lending and borrowing costs of SMEs. 
 
3. Reductions in cross-border lending made loan rate increases for SMEs more likely. 
 
4. The interbank lending channel drives these results.  
Highlights
